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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 15/05/2006

Accident number: 123

Accident time: 11:15

Accident Date: 25/05/1998

Where it occurred: Boundozi

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: none

Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: P2Mk2 P4Mk1 AP
blast

Ground condition: agricultural
(abandoned)
hard

Date record created: 12/02/2004

Date last modified: 08/07/2005

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate metal-detector (?)
inadequate training (?)
long handtool may have reduced injury (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
use of pick (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
safety distances ignored (?)
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Accident report
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly
available in October 1999. The following summarises its content.
At the time of the accident the demining team were using a one-man drill in a two-man team.
The victim had been a deminer for eight years. It was 14 days since his last leave and five
months since his last revision course. The accident occurred in an agricultural area and the
ground was described as "hard".
The investigators determined that the victim was working normally and registered a detector
reading, so marked the spot and began prodding towards it. Before he reached the marked
point an undetected mine detonated at 11:15. They found that he was working in a squatting
position without wearing his helmet. They also found that he "ignored" correct prodding
procedure and so applied pressure directly onto the pressure plate of the mine.
The Team Leader stated that the victim was working properly and that the accident was
caused by poor survey not identifying the kind of mine present.
The Section Leader said that the victim was working properly and the task should have been
allocated to a mine-dog team.
The victim's partner was ten metres away and said that he was working properly and the
accident was unpreventable.
The victim was not interviewed by the investigators.

Conclusion
The investigators determined that the victim prodded at the wrong angle and so detonated the
mine. He was in breach of safety procedures because he was squatting and not wearing a
helmet.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that survey teams gather information about mine types
accurately, that Team Leaders ensure that deminers lie prone and prod at the right angle
while wearing helmets. They recommended that the Section Leader in this case should be
disciplined and that Team Leaders should always try to identify the mine type involved in an
accident. [The victim identified the mine himself in a later interview – see Related papers.]

Victim Report
Victim number: 159

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: ot recorded

Protection issued: Helmet

Protection used: none

Thin, short visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
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minor Eyes
minor Face
minor Neck
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
An initial accident summarised the victim's injuries as "multiple wounds face and foreign
bodies both eyes and deep injuries shoulder and neck".
The victim described his own injuries as "superficial facial injuries, one fragment in his
shoulder, and shock".
He spent two weeks in hospital, then returned to work.
In July 1998, he had no facial scarring or sight-loss when interviewed by the researcher.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim
was workout a visor and was not corrected.
The field supervisors in this accident appear to have been unaware that it was against the
rules to wear no helmet and visor or to work squatting, which implies that their training may
have been inadequate. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”. The
investigators remained unaware that the victim was using a pick. Their harsh criticism of field
inefficiencies must be seen in the context of their inquiry not being made for three months
after the accident. The researcher's own informal inquiry uncovered more than their own. It
may be understandable that the deminers appear to have deliberately misled them.
The use of the pick and a squatting/kneeling position to "excavate" were both in breach of UN
requirements, but not in breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those
requirements. The failure of the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt SOPs for
local conditions, or enforce their own standards may be seen as a management failing.
It is possible that the visor was too damaged to see through properly (as was seen frequently
during 1998, 1999), in which case the failure to provide useable equipment may represent a
further management failing.
In 1999, the manager of the UN MAC wanted to add the comment that Afghanis were
reluctant “to take responsibility for their own action” and supervisors were reluctant to
"criticise"/correct their subordinates. He added that these were “cultural issues…not easily
overcome”.
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by
weeks.

Related papers
The file included maps of the site and photographs showing a hard hillside with patches of
scrubby grass.
The victim was interviewed in the field (working again after a few weeks) and said he had
been a deminer for eight years. The accident occurred while he was excavating a detector
reading in a semi-prone position (both knees were on the ground). He got a detector reading
(using a “Phillips” detector) and marked the reading with three stones.
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He started working from the closest stone to the middle stone with a pick and when he
reached the middle marker there was a P2 Mk2(/1) mine under the marker.
The victim said that the “Philips” detector was not capable of detecting this mine [“Philips” is
an Afghan synonym for the Schiebel.] When asked how he knew it was this mine, the victim
said that others were found later and since the blast was too small for other mines, it was
decided that he had “picked” onto one of these.

The photograph above shows him recreating the position he was in relative to the mine when
the accident occurred.
The victim said that he wore his visor, but partly raised.
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